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Abstract
Voter data is important in political science research and applications such as improving
youth voter turnout. Privacy protection is imperative in voter data since it often con-
tains sensitive individual information. Differential Privacy (DP) formalizes privacy in
probabilistic terms and provides a robust concept for privacy protection. DIfferentially
Private Data Synthesis (DIPS) techniques produce synthetic data in the DP setting.
However, statistical efficiency of the synthetic data via DIPS can be low due to the
potentially large amount of noise injected to satisfy DP, especially in high-dimensional
data, which is often the case in voter data. We propose a new DIPS approach STatis-
tical Election to Partition Sequentially (STEPS) that sequentially partitions data by
attributes per their contribution in explaining the data variability. Additionally, we
develop a metric to effectively assess the similarity of synthetic data to the actual data.
The application of the STEPS procedure on the 2000-2012 Current Population Survey
youth voter data suggests STEPS is easy to implement and preserves the original in-
formation better than some DIPS approaches including the Laplace mechanism on the
full cross-tabulation of the data and the hierarchical histograms generated via random
partitioning.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Prediction of election outcomes is a popular topic in political research and applications.
Statisticians and political scientists continuously improve their poll-based forecast models
or identify predictors and mechanisms for increasing and/or hindering voter turnout such
as online registration tools (Bennion & Nickerson 2011), social pressure (DellaVigna et al.
2017, Gerber et al. 2008), voter identification laws (Hicks et al. 2015, Highton 2017), and
world events like wars (Koch & Nicholson 2015). One voting group of particular interest
is youth voters (18-24 years old), which has the lowest turnout out of any age group in
the United States . If more youth voted, election outcomes could drastically change. For
instance, during the 2012 United States Presidential Election, at least 80 of the electoral
votes from major swing states like Ohio and Florida were decided by youth voters, securing
the presidency for Obama (CIRCLE 2013).
Voter data provide important information essential for researchers and politicians to
understand voter turnout. On the other hand, voter data also contain individual sensi-
tive information like the voters’ family income (Barber & Imai 2014, Holbein & Hillygus
2016a, Imai & Khanna 2016). One way of mitigating the privacy concern is removing iden-
tifiers in the released data. However, a data intruder can still expose the personal infor-
mation of participants in the voter data by linking the data to other publicly accessible
and anonymized data sets. For instance, in 1997, the Massachusetts Group Insurance Com-
mission provided medical researchers access to the state of Massachusetts employee health
records as an anonymized data set with personal identifiers such as names and Social Se-
curity Numbers removed. The Massachusetts governor at the time assured that removing
the identifiers would provide complete privacy protection. A few days later, Sweeney (1997)
identified the governor by linking the voter data to the state healthcare data set and mailed
his healthcare information to his office. More recently, Sweeney et al. (2013) used voter data
and other public data sets to identify individuals in the Personal Genome Project, a program
that aims to sequence genetic information of 100,000 individuals for medical research such as
improving personalized medicine. Therefore, it is important to develop effective and efficient
privacy preserving techniques to analyze or release voter data.
1.2 Current work on data release with privacy protection
Various approaches have been developed to provide protection for sensitive information when
releasing data to researchers or the public, among which data synthesis (DS) is a popular
technique that provides synthetic individual-level data based on the values from the original
data (Drechsler 2011, Little 1993, Little et al. 2004, Liu & Little 2003, Raghunathan et al.
2003, Reiter 2003, 2009, Rubin 1993). The evaluation of the disclosure risk of the release data
by the DS is often based on making strong assumptions on the data intruder’s background
knowledge and behaviors (Hundepool et al. 2012, Reiter 2005). One DS approach that al-
lows researchers access to a data set with a preset level of privacy protection is DIfferentially
Private data Synthesis (DIPS). DIPS combines DS with differential privacy (DP), a rigorous
mathematical concept developed from computer science that controls privacy risk with a pre-
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specified privacy budget (Dwork et al. 2006). DIPS approaches can be roughly grouped into
the non-parametric DIPS (NP-DIPS) and parametric DIPS (P-DIPS) approaches. Bowen &
Liu (2016) compare multiple DIPS approaches at prespecified privacy budgets in the statis-
tical utility of the perturbed data via the nonparametric DIPS such as the Laplace sanitizer
(Dwork et al. 2006) and the smooth and perturbed histograms (Wasserman & Zhou 2010),
the parametric-DIPS including the Multinomial-Dirichlet sanitizer (Machanavajjhala et al.
2008) and the MOdel-based DIPS (MODIPS) (Liu 2016) in extensive simulation studies with
various data types.
In addition to the one-step DIPS methods, there are also sequential or hierarchical meth-
ods to release differentially private data or statistics. For example, Xiao et al. (2010) propose
Privlet via a two-step wavelet-based multidimensional partitioning approach. Privlet has
been shown to be very effective in the 1-dimensional case, but made only slight improvements
in the 2-dimensional case, and the performance would be even worse at higher dimensions
(Qardaji et al. 2013a). Hay et al. (2010) develop the universal histogram to inject noise to
low-dimensional histograms with improved accuracy in histogram bin counts by exploring
the inherent consistency constraints in the hierarchical histogram and using post-processing
to satisfy the consistency constraints. Qardaji et al. (2013c) extend the method to relatively
high dimensional data. Xiao et al. (2012) propose a two-phase partitioning approach for
multidimensional data cubes or histograms called DPCube. Gardner et al. (2013) conducted
a followup study by implementing DPCube on biomedical data to explore its practical fea-
sibility on real-world data sets, but discovered that DPCube is inefficient in constructing
accurate high-dimensional histograms. Li et al. (2017) introduce two partitioning-based
mechanisms – the privacy-aware partitioning mechanism and the utility-based partitioning
mechanism, respectively – that depend on a public but personalized (individual) privacy
parameter. These methods have not been implemented to real-world data, likely due to
being “... unable to provide corresponding error guarantees with such procedures for general
functions” (Cummings & Durfee 2018).
There also exist work on drawing statistical inferences from synthetic data generated
by DIPS approaches. For example, Charest (2010) incorporates the DP mechanism in a
Bayesian framework where the analysis of the perturbed binary data was through the Beta-
Binomial DP mechanism (McClure & Reiter 2012) to reduce the inferential bias in the
synthetic binary data. Karwa et al. (2017) propose a randomized response scheme in the
differential privacy framework to synthesize the edges for social network data and designed
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method to obtain posterior inferences based on the synthe-
sized network. Liu (2016) suggests releasing multiple synthetic data sets to account for the
synthesis and sanitization uncertainty and proposes a variance combination rule to obtain
inferences from the multiple sets.
1.3 Goals and contributions
As stated in Sec 1.1, voter data are critical for poll-based forecast modeling and other political
science research, but are also prone for exposing personal information. We aim to develop
a DIPS approach to release differentially private synthetic data given the original so that
researcher may perform analyses on the data with minimal concerns for individual privacy.
3
The youth voter data that we focus on in this paper come from the 2000-2012 Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) downloaded from the Harvard Dataverse (Holbein & Hillygus
2016b), where Holbein & Hillygus (2016a) analyzed the data to examine if states with pre-
registration laws increases youth voter turnout. There are 15 categorical attributes, the
number of the categories per attribute ranging from 2 to 14. Directly applying the Laplace
sanitizer + Perturbed histogram approach to the data would lead to a sparse cross-tabulation
of the 15 variables. Though simple and straightforward, the data utility can be low when
the privacy budget is small. The MODIPS approach is model-dependent, where some types
of dimensionality reduction and model selection procedure would be needed as well as likely
based on a set of assumptions. In addition, these procedures themselves would cost privacy.
Other methods such as Privlet and DPcube also have feasibility issues for high-dimensional
data as stated in Sec 1.2. In summary, there is still a lot of room for enhancing the statisti-
cal utility of the synthetic data with reasonable practical feasibility, when developing DIPS
methods are the voter data or data of similar types.
We propose a new DIPS approach – STatistical Election to Partition Sequentially
(STEPS) – to synthesize data in a differentially private manner. STEPS injects noises
sequentially to a hierarchy of histograms, the order of which is determined by a statistical
metric that quantifies the ability of each attribute in explaining the variability in data. A
post-processing procedure similar to the universal histogram approach follows to ensure the
equality constraints in the hierarchical decomposition. Compared to other partition based
methods listed in Section 1.2, the STEPS leverages and utilizes the inherent statistical
variability of the data when deciding the sequence of the partition, which is expected to
improve the statistical utility of the released data compared to a random partitioning order.
We also provide a propensity score based method – Synthetic Data Generation, Propensity
Score Matching, Empirical CDF, Comparison based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov (SPECKS) –
to assess the similarity between the synthetic and actual data. Similar to other propensity
score based utility measures (Sakshaug & Raghunathan 2010, Snoke et al. 2018, Woo et al.
2009), SPECKS is a general utility metric and provides a holistic measure for the similarity
of two data sets of the same structure of any dimension. Meanwhile, SPECKS also has its
own advantages compared to other propensity-score approaches. Specifically, SPECKS does
not discretize data and better recognizes the heterogeneity of the propensity scores, and is
“nonparametric” once the propensity scores are given. The SPECKS metric is l∞-norm like
as it utilizes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance, which measures the maximum distance
of two CDFs. It is easy to compute and enjoys an intuitive interpretation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview
on DP and introduces the STEPS procedure and the SPECKS metric. Section 3 applies
the STEPS method to the CPS youth voter data and compares the statistical utility of
the synthetic data generated by the STEPS procedure, the Laplace sanitizer on the full
histogram, and a modified universal histogram procedure. In Section 4, we discuss the
implications of our results and provide future research directions.
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2 Statistical methodology
2.1 Differential privacy
Originally developed for query based methods, DP provides a mathematical and rigorous
framework to develop approaches for protecting individuals in the a data set, regardless of
the background knowledge or behaviors of data intruders (Dwork et al. 2006). Query results,
in statistical terminology, are statistics; so we will use queries, query results, and statistics,
interchangeably, which are denoted by s. We denote the data for privacy protection by
x = {xij} of dimension n× p (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , p). Each row xi represents an indi-
vidual record with p variables/attributes. We assume the sample size n is public knowledge
and carries no privacy information.
Definition 1. Differential Privacy (Dwork et al. 2006): A sanitization algorithm R gives
-DP if for all data sets (x,x′) that is d(x,x′) = 1, and all results Q ⊆ T∣∣∣∣log( Pr(R(s(x)) ∈ Q)Pr(R(s(x′)) ∈ Q)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ , (1)
where T denotes the output range of R, s denotes statistics, d(x,x′) = 1 represents all
possible ways that data x′ differing from x by one individual, and  > 0 is the privacy
“budget” parameter. In other words, when  is small, more noise is injected to the statistic s
via the sanitized algorithm R. This means the individuals in the data set are at a low risk of
having their sensitive information disclosed, because s would be about the same regardless if
any person was present or absent in the data set. Vice-versa, when  is large, the probability
or chance of identifying someone is higher, because less noise is added to s.
In regards to what value of  is considered appropriate or acceptable for practical use,
Dwork (2008) states the choice of  is a social question. Abowd & Schmutte (2015) acknowl-
edge this and suggest  at 0.01 ∼ ln(3), or even up to 3 in releasing certain statistics in social
and economic studies. Other  values have been applied in the literature when DP is applied
to cases studies. For example, Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) applied DP in the OnTheMap
data (commuting patterns of the United States population) and used ( = 8.6, δ = 10−5)-
probabilistic DP (a relaxation of the pure DP) to synthesize commuter data. Ding et al.
(2011) and Li et al. (2014) used  = 1. These examples suggest there are many factors
that affect the choice of , including the type of information released to the public, social
perception of privacy protection, statistical accuracy of the release data, among others. For
a socially acceptable  given a certain type of information, a differentially private mechanism
should aim for maximizing the accuracy of the released information. In other words, choos-
ing an “appropriate”  is essentially a question of finding a good trade-off between privacy
loss and released information accuracy.
An important property of DP is that the privacy cost increases for every new query being
sent to the same data set, because more information is “leaked” with each additional query.
Therefore, the data curator must track all statistics calculated on the data set to guarantee
the privacy budget does not exceed the prespecified level. For example, if all q queries are
sent to data set x, then /q can be allocated to each query to ensure the privacy budget
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is maintained at  per the sequential composition principle by McSherry (2009). When no
overlapping information is requested by different queries, such as when they are calculated
from disjoint subsets of a data set, the privacy cost does not accumulate. In such a case, the
parallel composition principle applies and the overall privacy cost is the maximum privacy
budget spent across q queries (McSherry 2009). For example, in the release of a histogram,
where the counts in different bins of the histogram are based on disjoint subsets of data,
each bin can be perturbed with the full privacy budget.
Additionally, Dwork et al. (2006), Machanavajjhala et al. (2008), and Dwork & Roth-
blum (2016) proposed conceptual relaxations of the pure DP (approximate DP, probabilistic
DP, and concentrated DP, respectively) to lessen the amount of noise injected by DP meth-
ods, where some privacy is sacrificed for more utility.
A common and easy way to implement DP is the Laplace mechanism. A key concept
for the Laplace mechanism is calculating the l1 global sensitivity of a query or statistic,
which is, for a statistic s is ∆1 = maxx,x′,d(x,x′)=1‖s(x)− s(x′)‖1 for all d(x,x′) = 1 (Dwork
et al. 2006). The global sensitivity can also be defined in other forms, such as the l2 global
sensitivity (Dwork & Roth 2013) and lp global sensitivity for any p ≥ 1 (Liu 2019).
Definition 2. Laplace Mechanism: (Dwork et al. 2006): The Laplace sanitizer adds
noise to s = (s1, . . . , sK) via s
∗
k = nk + ek, where ek∼Lap(0,∆1/) and is independent for
k = 1, . . . , K and ∆1 is the l1 global sensitivity of s.
When  is small or ∆1 is large, more Laplace noise is added to s. Other common DP
mechanisms include the Exponential mechanism that applies to both numerical and non-
numerical queries (McSherry & Talwar 2007), the Gaussian mechanism that relies on the
relaxed probabilistic DP (Dwork & Roth 2013, Liu 2019), and among others.
When releasing differentially private information, we could release query-based statistics
or individual-level data. In the former case, satisfying the prespecified  when releasing mul-
tiple queries while maintaining some level of data utility becomes an issue due the allocation
of the overall privacy budget per the sequential composition (or, equivalently speaking, the
increased global sensitivity with multiple queries). Once the privacy budget is exhausted
from answering queries, the data curator must refuse to accept any more queries. Another
issue with query-based data release is that the data user might not know all the statistics
they would like to get from the data or might just prefer to conduct analysis on their own
instead of relying on the data curator. DIPS methods resolve these challenges by producing
differentially private individual-level synthetic data with a prespecified level of privacy.
2.2 STatistical Election to Partition Sequentially (STEPS)
Suppose there are p attributes in a data set, and the joint distribution of the p attributes
is denoted by f(X1, X2, . . . , Xp). STEPS utilizes the decomposition f(X1, X2, . . . , Xp) =
f(X1)f(X2|X1) · · · , f(Xp|X1, . . . , Xp−1), and injects noises to f(X1), f(X2|X1), . . . ,
f(Xp|X1, . . . , Xp−1) sequentially, followed by a post-processing procedure similar to the uni-
versal histogram approach to ensure the equality constraints in the hierarchical decomposi-
tion, with some necessary modifications.
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In the original universal histogram approach, the full histogram (or cross-tabulation)
of the attributes in a data set is constructed in a hierarchical manner by first forming low-
dimensional histograms and then continuously partitioning (which adds more dimensions)
until it reaches the individual cells from the full histogram. Denote the hierarchical tree
generated this way by P . Let v denote a node in P and succ(v) be the set containing all v’s
children. For example, a node could present the level “white” in attribute “race”, and its
children (partitioned further by gender) could be “white female” and “white male”. There
is a count associated with each node. The l1 global sensitivity of releasing the tree P is the
tree height, L, per the sequential and parallel composition theorems. Denote all the node
counts in P by n, then the sanitized counts are n∗ = n+ e, where each entry in e is drawn
from Lap(0, L−1). The universal histogram algorithm leverages the inherent consistency
constraint in P (that is, the sum counts in succ(v) is equal to the count of their parent node
v). To correct the inconsistency caused by the additional noise, the universal histogram
procedure first calculates the inconsistent node counts z via Eqn (2) in a bottom-up manner,
z[v] =
{
n∗[v], if v is a leaf node
bl−bL−1
bL−1 n
∗[v] + b
L−bL−1
bL−1
∑
u∈succ(v) z[u], otherwise
(2)
where b is the number of children per node, which is a constant in P , and then applies the
top-down scan to compute the final released count n¯∗ via Eqn (3), where u is v’s parent.
n¯∗[v] =
{
z[v], if v is the root node
z[v] + 1
b
(n¯∗[u]−∑w∈succ(u) z[w]), otherwise (3)
The constant number of children per node b can be set by the data user (b ≥ 2). Qardaji
et al. (2013c) examine how b and the total number of cells N in the full histogram/cross-
tabulation affect the MSE of queries based on n¯∗ via the universal histogram algorithm
relative to the one-step Laplace sanitizer. The universal histogram procedure is mostly stud-
ied in the context of a single attribute, where the high-level nodes will be some combination
of the attribute categories/bins and the leaf nodes in the lowest level are the finest cate-
gories/bins for the attribute. Though the universal histogram procedure can be applied to
multidimensional data, its benefit over the one-step Laplace sanitizer seems to diminish over
increasing dimensionality (Qardaji et al. 2013b,c).
Procedurally, the STEPS method synthesizes individual-level data by sequentially in-
jecting noises to a hierarchy of histograms of the attributes in the data set, followed by a
post-processing procedure similar to the universal histogram approach. However, compared
to the regular universal histogram algorithm, the STEPS procedure leverages the inherent
information in the data and uses a statistical criterion to decide the sequence for partitioning.
Specifically, the sequence of the attributes by which the data are partitioned is determined
by a metric. This metric quantifies the marginal contribution of an attribute that explains
the variability in a data set. Any commonly used information metrics for comparing models
or measuring goodness of fit of a model can be used, such as AIC, BIC, or a deviance statis-
tic. The attribute that explains the most variability in a data set marginally in each layer of
the histogram hierarchy is referred to as the MVA (most valuable attribute). For example,
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the MVA could be the attribute with the largest decrease AIC if used as a predictor in the
model compared to the intercept-only model.
The steps of the STEP procedure are given in Algorithm 1. The nodes in layer l (for
l = 0, 1, . . . , L) are denoted by v(l). v(0) is the whole data. K(l) denotes the maximum
number of nodes in layer l. Per the discussion above, once a node is used in partitioning
data along a branch in P , it is no longer available. We denote the availability set for node
k ∈ v(l) layer l by A(l)
v(l)[k]
. A(0)
v(0)[1]
contains all p attributes in the data.
Algorithm 1 STatistical Election to Partition Sequentially with L layers (STEPS-L)
1: Input: number of partition layers L(≤ p); overall privacy budget ; allocation scheme
C; number of synthetic sets m; original data D (see Remark 1).
2: Set l = 0
3: while l < L do
4: for k = 1 to K(l)
• Apply a loglinear model separately to the one-way table formed by each attribute in
A(l)
v(l)[k]
, and calculate the information metric associated with each of the attributes
in A(l)
v(l)[k]
; and identify the MVA Xj.
• Partition the data by the MVA Xj (see Remark 2).
• Let A(l)
v(l)[k]
← A(l)
v(l)[k]
\Xj, and v(l) ← v(l) \ v(l)j , where v(l)j denotes all the levels of
Xj.
• l← l + 1
5: end do
6: end do
7: If A(L
v(L)
=Ø, go to Step 3 directly; otherwise (A(L
v(L)
is not an empty set), apply
the full cross-tabulation over all the attributes in A(L
v(L)
for each node in layer L
v(L)[1], . . . , v(L)[K(L)] (see Remark 3).
8: Sanitize all nodes in the generated tree P via the Laplace mechanism with the allocation
scheme C in the sanitization of the layers in P . Suppose layer l receives a fraction of
cl of the privacy budget /m, then the nodes in layer l are sanitized by the Laplace
mechanism with scale parameter (cl/m)
−1 (see Remark 4).
9: Apply the universal histogram procedure in Eqns (2) and (3) to obtain the sanitized
counts n¯∗. If all attributes are categorical, n¯∗ can be released directly; otherwise, an
extra step of uniform sampling is applied draw numerical attributes from the histogram
bins.
10: Output: m synthetic sets D˜(1), . . . , D˜(m)
Remark 1. In the regular universal histogram framework, L is computed as logbN , where
N is total number cells in the cross-tabulation. In the STEPS algorithm, if the tree splits by
all p attributes, then L = p; but it does not have to be and can be set at a value < p, unless
we allow different levels of an attribute to span across multiple level (there does not seem to
exist such a need from a statistical perspective as mentioned above). The regular universal
histogram approach has an exponential time complexity O(bL) in L for a given b, implying a
large L would dramatically increase the computational time (Qardaji et al. 2013c). Lastly,
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the larger L is the less privacy budget each layer will receive for sanitization, implying more
noises are injected into the individual nodes in each layer. However, since the counts in
earlier layers are weighted averages of multiple nodes per Eqn (3), the loss in privacy budget
in per layer could be offset by the information aggregation over multiple nodes. Therefore,
in theory, there exists an optimal L by a certain data utility criterion (such as l1 error, mean
squared error of certain queries). We suggest users try different values of L and pick the
optimal one for satisfying a certain data utility criterion (e.g, the SPECKS metric), within
computational limit. For future work, we will also look into devising a stopping rule to choose
L adaptively, such as by defining a threshold on SDM. If the SDM associated with the MVA
at layer l is smaller than the threshold, then the partitioning stops. More discussion on this
are provided in Section 4.
Remark 2. The rationale for choosing the most valuable attribute (MVA) for partition in
STEPS is that it is the most important attribute for understanding the variability in counts in
a particular subset (partition) of the original data and thus “deserves” more privacy budget.
As a result, less noise will be injected and more original information on that variable can be
preserved. This also relates to how the privacy budget is allocated across the layers.
Remark 3. When L < p − 1, there will be more than one attributes left in A(L)
v(L)
after
layer L. Per the STEPS procedure in Algorithm 1, no more partitioning will be applied to
A(L)
v(L)
and the leaf nodes will be made of the cells from the full cross-tabulation over all the
remaining attributes in A(L)
v(L)
under each parent in layer L.
Remark 4. Different allocation scheme C can be specified by users. For an equal allocation
scheme, C = (1/L, . . . , 1/L) if Step 2 is skipped, and C = (1/(L+1), . . . , 1/(L+1)) otherwise.
An unequal allocation scheme can also be used, such as 1/2 to layer (L + 1) that contains
the full cross-tabulation over remaining attributes; and 1/2 to layers 1 to L that is further
split among the L layers, results in the following allocation scheme in sanitizing the layers
C = (/(2mL), . . . , /(2mL), /(2m)).
2.3 General utility metric SPECKS
We develop the SPECKS (Synthetic Data Generation; Propensity Score Matching; Empirical
CDF Comparison via the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance) metric to assess the similar-
ity between the synthetic data and actual data. SPECKS is a propensity-score general utility
measure, and shares some of the common features as other propensity-score utility measures
but also has its own advantage. For instance, like the other propensity-score utility measures,
SPECKS first combines the synthetic and actual data, based on which the propensity score
of each observation in the combined data belongs to the synthetic (or the actual) data is
estimated. How SPECKS differs from other propensity score based approaches is the way it
formulates the final utility metric from the estimated the propensity scores. The Chi-squared
test based method developed by Sakshaug & Raghunathan (2010) is based on discretization
of the estimated propensity scores. The MSE of the propensity score from the actual pro-
portions computed by Woo et al. (2009) that does not directly taken into the distribution of
propensity scores. Snoke et al. (2018) improve the metric by standardizing the statistic by
its null expected value and standard deviation. The re-scaling helps the interpretability of
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the utility of synthetic data and also seems to be more sensitive in telling the synthetic data
from the actual data. However, the derivation of the null expected value and standard devi-
ation is based on some large-sample assumptions. In contrast, SPECKS does not discretize
data nor recognizes the heterogeneity of the propensity scores, and is “nonparametric” once
the propensity scores are given. While the MSE metrics (both raw and standardized) are
l2-norm like, the SPECKS metric is l∞-norm like as it utilizes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
distance, which is the maximum distance of two CDFs. The steps of SPECKS are given in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 The SPECKS Procedure
1: Combine the original or synthetic data, each of size n. Create a indicator variable T
where Ti = 1 if record i is from the actual data and Ti = 0 otherwise for i = 1, . . . , 2n.
2: Calculate the PS for each record i, ei = Pr(Ti = 1|xi), through a logistic regression
model, where the predictors are the variables of x.
3: Calculate the empirical CDFs of the PS, Fˆ (e) and F˜ (e), for the actual and the synthetic
groups, separately.
4: Compute the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance d = supe |F˜ (e) − Fˆ (e)| between the two
empirical CDFs (If multiple synthetic data are generated, the average KS distance over
the multiple sets will be calculated).
If the synthetic data preserves the original information well, then the observations from
the two groups are indistinguishable and a small KS distance between the original and
synthetic empirical CDFs is expected. SPECKS is a general method and can be used to
compare the similarity of two data sets of the same structure of any dimension, without
making assumptions on the distributions of the attributes. The procedure used in each step
is standard statistical procedure and can be implemented using any standard software.
There also exists also similarity measures between two data sets. For example, Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence seems to be a natural choice given that it measures the divergence
of a distribution from a reference/theoretical distribution. Although it can accommodate
various data types, the KL divergence can be sensitive to how the empirical distribution is
constructed especially when there are continuous attributes and the sample size is small.
Karr et al. (2006) and Woo et al. (2009) examined several similarity measures including the
KL divergence and found the method that uses propensity scores (PS) to estimate general
utility to be the most promising.
3 Differentially private synthesis of the 2002-2012 CPS youth voter
data
We apply the STEPS procedure to generate the differentially private synthetic CPS youth
voter data. We bench-marked STEPS against the one-step Laplace sanitizer on the full
histogram and the universal histogram procedure with a random partition. The Laplace
sanitizer is the standard to compare against since the method is easy to implement, com-
putationally fast, and still outperforms many other DIPS methods such as DPCube (Bowen
& Liu 2016, Hay et al. 2016). The youth voter data set contains 15 variables and 44,821
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observations (Table 1). In this applications, all attributes are treated as categorical.
Variable Values
Voted 0, 1 (no, yes)
Preregistration State 0, 1 (no, yes)
Age 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
Married 0, 1 (no, yes)
Female 0, 1 (no, yes)
Family Income 14 levels
College Degree 0, 1 (no, yes)
White 0, 1 (no, yes)
Hispanic 0, 1 (no, yes)
Registration Status 0, 1 (no, yes)
Metropolitan Area 0, 1 (no, yes)
Length of Residence 6 levels
Business / Farm Employment 0, 1 (no, yes)
In-Person Interview 0, 1 (no, yes)
DMV Registration 0, 1 (no, yes)
Table 1: List of variables and their values from youth voter subset in the 2000-2012 CPS data.
Section 3.1 lists the step-by-step implementation of the STEPS procedure in the voter
data. Section 3.2 shows how STEPS performs against the one-step Laplace sanitizer and the
random partition by the SPECKS general utility metric. Sections 3.3 evaluates the practical
utility of the STEPS synthetic data by applying three types of statistical analyses to the
voter data.
3.1 STEPS
We apply Algorithm 1 and used the AIC from the univariate loglinear models as the metric
to evaluate the contribution of each variable to explaining variability in the original data and
the subsets of the original data generated along the hierarchy tree. In determining the tree
length L for the STEPS procedure, we tried both L = 2 and 3. We started to experience
computational limitations when L ≥ 4. In addition, the results at L = 3 were similar to
L = 2 in preserving original information, but was computationally more expensive. We also
examined a couple of the privacy budget allocation schedules as described in Remark 4 for
STEPS-2 and STEPS-3: 1) equal allocation of  among the L + 1 layers of the tree; and
2) (1/2 + 1/L) allocation: half of  to layer L + 1 that contains the full cross-tabulation of
the remaining attributes; and the other half to layers 1 ∼ L, which is further split equally
among the L layers. To demonstrate the advantage of the STEPS procedure of using the
MVA to split when constructing the tree, we also split by a random set of attributes with
2 layers. Random Partition-2 can be regarded a “shallow” version of the original universal
histogram approach by building only 2 layers in the tree hierarchy. In summary, we ran
STEPS-2, STEPS-3, and Random Partition-2, which were all bench-marked against the
one-step Laplace sanitizer applied to the full cross-tabulation. Table 2 lists the the cell sizes
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and frequencies from the 15-way cross-tabulation.
Cell size 0 1 2 3 4 5 > 5
Number of Cells 1,268,911 14,061 3,545 1,508 740 425 1,050
Proportion 98.35% 1.09% 0.27% 0.12% 0.06% 0.03% 0.08%
Table 2: Summary of cell sizes and frequencies in the full cross tabulation of the youth voter data.
Table 3 shows the partitioning in STEP-2. In STEP-2, the first-layer variable “family
income” has the smallest AIC among the 15 univariate log-linear models. Within the subset
of observations whose “family income = 1”, “length of residence” was associated within the
smallest AIC among the 14 univariate log-linear models; similarly for other levels of “family
income”. For STEPS-3, the nodes in Layer 2 listed for STEPS-2 are also subject to splitting
(not presented due to the large size of the table).
layer 1 2
Family Income (1) Length of Residence
Family Income (2) Length of Residence
Family Income (3) Length of Residence
Family Income (4) Married
Family Income (5) Length of Residence
Family Income (6) Registration Status
variable Family Income (7) Registration Status
(level) Family Income (8) Registration Status
Family Income (9) Registration Status
Family Income (10) Length of Residence
Family Income (11) Length of Residence
Family Income (12) Length of Residence
Family Income (13) Length of Residence
Family Income (14) Length of Residence
Table 3: Sequential partitions in STEPS-2.
Figure 1 presents a sketch on the tree built by STEP-2. The root node (layer 0) contains
the overall sample, which was not sanitized as the sample size is often public knowledge.
The next layer (layer 1) contains 14 nodes, one per level of “family income”. In the node
containing all sub-samples with “family income = 1”, the MVA is “Length of Residence”,
meaning the children of the node “family income = 1” are obtained from splitting “Length
of Residence”. Similarly, in the node containing all sub-samples with “family income = 4”,
the next layer MVA is “Married”. In layer 3, there is no more partitioning, the leaf nodes
are the cells from the full cross-tabulation of the remaining attributes not used in layers 1
and 2 in each branch of the tree.
After the tree is generated, the next step is to apply the universal histogram procedure to
the tree. The universal histogram procedure as mentioned in Section 2 requires the number
of children per parent node to be constant. The attributes in the voter data, as observed from
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Table 1 have different levels. To accommodate the requirement of the universal histogram
algorithm, we create phantom categories (as shown in Figure 1) to make each attribute
have the same number of categories as “family income” since “family income” has the most
categories (14). These phantom categories are created solely for the purposes of applying
the universal histogram procedure and always have zero counts. The phantom categories
will be removed once the synthetic data are generated. The global sensitivity for layer 1 and
2 is 1/2 per the universal histogram algorithm. For the bottom layer, the global sensitivity
is 1 since the full cross-tabulation of the remaining attributes is sanitized.
 
+ 8 phantom  
nodes 
… 
Whole data 
Family income 1 Family income 2 Family income 3 Family income 4 
Married Y Married N 
Length  
Residence 1 
… + 12 phantom  
nodes 
Length  
Residence 6 
Family income 14 
13-way cross- 
tabulation on 
remaining attributes 
13-way cross- 
tabulation on 
remaining attributes 
13-way cross- 
tabulation on 
remaining attributes 
Figure 1: A sketch of the constructed tree in STEPS-2.
We generated 5 synthetic data sets to account for the synthesis and sanitization vari-
ability and ran 24 repetitions to quantify the stability of the DIPS methods. We examined
privacy budget  ∈ exp{−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} to see how  affects the utility of the synthetic data.
Since we generated 5 synthetic data sets, /5 was allocated to each data set per the sequential
composition to ensure an overall privacy budget of .
3.2 General utility assessment by SPECKS
We used R package MatchIT for to obtain the propensity scores with options method =
optimal and distance = logit (Ho 2011), and then applied R command ks.test; to cal-
culate the KS statistic between the empirical CDFs of the propensity scores in the actual
and synthetic groups, respectively. We used method optimal instead of the default near-
est neighbor matching method because optimal matching minimizes the distance between
matched pairs more than the nearest neighbor algorithm (Gu & Rosenbaum 1993).
Figure 2 depicts the results on the SPECKS analysis with the (1/2+1/L) privacy budget
allocation scheme (the results from the equal allocation of  in STEPS-2 and STEPS-3 are
worse and not presented). For all methods, the KS distance decreased as  increased as
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expected since the synthetic data is supposed to become more similar to the actual data
with more privacy budget (less noise injected and synthetic data). On the other hand, the
expected trend also provides empirical evidence that SPECKS is a reasonable metric to
measure the similarity between synthetic and original data. Overall, STEPS-2 and STEPS-
3 are very similar and outperform the Laplace sanitizer and the random partition. When
 < e0 = 1, Random Partition-2 has similar SPECKS as the STEPS procedures, likely
because the large amount of noise injected overshadows the statistical signals recognized by
STEPS. All three procedures outperform than the one-step Laplace sanitizer. As  increases,
the advantages of STEPS start to show with the biggest lead over the other two methods
at  = e ≈ 2.72. The Laplace sanitize and the two STEPS procedures perform equally well
at  = e2 per the SPECKS metric, and all have a smaller SPECKS metric than the random
partition. Based on the results, we chose to further explore STEPS-2 (STEPS-2 took less
computational time than STEPS-3) in the statistical feasibility analyses in Section 3.3, and
compare STEPS-2 to the one-step Laplace sanitizer.
0.90 
0.80 0 Laplace Sanitizer 
0 STEPS-2· 
◊ STEPS-3
� Random Partition-2 
log(c) 
0. 70 ....____,..__ ______________ _ 
-2 -1 O_ 1 2 
K
S
 d
is
ta
nc
e
Figure 2: SPECKS analysis of the synthetic data generated from one-step Laplace sanitizer, STEPS,
and universal histogram with random partition.
3.3 Statistical analysis for practical feasibility
We assess the practical feasibility of the synthetic data generated from the one-step Laplace
sanitizer and STEPS-2 using three types of statistical analyses at  = e ≈ 2.72 and  = e−1 ≈
0.368, respectively. We chose these two  values since both are fairly small, implying a high
level of privacy protection. In addition, the SPECKS analysis in Figure 2 shows at  = e−1
and e yielded larger KS differences between STEPS-2 and the other DIPS methods. From
 = e−1 to e1, we expect to see an improvement in the results for both the one-step Laplace
sanitizer and the STEPS-2 procedure. We generated 5 synthetic data sets and appropriately
combined the statistical inferences with the multiple synthesis combination rule (Liu 2016).
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For the first practical feasibility assessment, we calculated the l1 distance between the
synthetic and the original cell counts in the full cross-tabulation of the 15 attributes. A
smaller l1 distance indicates the sanitized cell counts are closer to the original counts overall.
When  = e−1, the one-step Laplace sanitizer has a l1 distance of 43,908.4 whereas STEPS-2
has a smaller l1 distance of 43,065.6, averaged over the 5 synthetic sets. When  = e, the two
methods perform similarly, where the one-step Laplace sanitizer has a l1 distance of 42,068.2
and STEPS-2 has a l1 distance of 42,072.7.
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Figure 3: Consistency rate on the Chi-square tests for independence based on the original vs syn-
thetic data.
For the second analysis, we conducted the chi-squared tests of association for all possible
2-way tables (105 in total) across the 15 attributes to see how well the DIPS approaches
preserved statistically significant 2-way associations among the attributes. Note the goal
here is not to report which associations are statistically significant across all 105 tables, so
there is no need for multiplicity adjustment. We combined the p-values across the 5 surrogate
data sets via the combination rules from Li et al. (1991). Figure 3 presents the consistency
rate (percentage that the test conclusions are consistent between the original and synthetic
data out of 105 tests) at the significance levels of α = {1, 5, 10}%. When  = e−1, STEPS-2
outperforms the Laplace sanitizer at all α = 1% and 5%, and is similar at α = 10%. At
 = e, the STEPS procedure and the Laplace sanitizer have similar performance.
For the third feasibility analysis, we adopted the difference-in-differences (DID) model
to examine the effects of “Preregistration State” on “Voted”, controlling for “Registration
Status” as conducted by Holbein & Hillygus (2016a). In the DID logistic regression model,
the outcome is “Vote” with all the other 14 attributes as predictors plus an interaction term
between “Preregistration State” and “Registration Status”. “Age” is treated as a numerical
predictor whereas the others are categorical, leading to a total of 32 regression coefficients,
including the intercept. The logistf function with the Firth’s bias reduction in R package
logistf (Ploner et al. 2010) was employed to fit the model. We averaged the coefficient
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estimates over 5 synthetic sets and calculated their differences from the original coefficient
estimates, Table 4 lists which coefficient estimates out of 32 in the one-step Laplace sanitizer
and STEPS-2 had the same sign as in the original analysis. When  = e−1, STEPS-2 had 17
Table 4: Sign consistency on the DID regression coefficients with the original on DID coefficient
estimate for the Laplace sanitizer and STEPS-2 methods.
 = e−1  = e
Variable Laplace sanitizer STEPS-2 Laplace sanitizer STEPS-2
Intercept Y Y Y Y
Age N Y N Y
Married N Y Y Y
Female N N Y Y
Family Income† 1Y/13 9Y/13 3Y/13 10Y/13
College Degree Y Y N N
White N N N N
Hispanic N Y Y Y
Metropolitan Area N N Y Y
Length of Residence† 2Y/5 0Y/5 4Y/5 4Y/5
Business/Farm Employment Y N N N
In-Person Interview N Y Y Y
DMV Registration N Y Y Y
Preregistration State Y N N N
Registration Status Y Y Y Y
Interaction of Registration
× Preregistration State N N N N
# of consistent signs 8 17 15 23
Y and N represent the same and difference sign from the original analysis.
† “Family Income” has 14 levels, and thus 13 coefficients associated with 13 dummy variables; “Length
of Residence” has 6 levels, and thus 5 coefficients
coefficients with the same sign as the original whereas the one-step Laplace sanitizer only has
8. When  = e, the number of coefficients with the same sign as the original increased to 23
for STEPS-2, and to 15 for the one-step Laplace sanitizer. Figure 4 shows the 95% confidence
interval (CI) of the DID coefficients from the one-step Laplace sanitizer and the STEPS-2
method. When  = e−1, the CIs for the one-step Laplace sanitizer approach covers slightly
fewer of the original coefficients than STEPS-2 (21 and 24, respectively). As  increases
from e−1 to e, the CIs for the one-step Laplace sanitizer covers more coefficients (from 21
to 25 coefficients, respectively). However, when  increased from e−1 to e, the CIs for the
the STEPS-2 approach covered less coefficients (from 24 to 21 coefficients, respectively).
Comparing the width of the CIs, when  = e−1, the STEP-2 procedure has shorter CIs 15
out of 32 compared to the Laplace sanitizer, and increased to 18 at  = e. Overall, the
one-step Laplace sanitizer and the STEPS-2 method did not show significant differences in
this analysis and the increase in  did not seem to affect the results much either.
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Figure 4: The 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the DID coefficients from the one-step Laplace
sanitizer and STEPS-2 method.
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4 Concluding Remarks
We propose a new DIPS method – STEPS – to synthesize differentially private individual-
level data with the goal to improve the statistical utility of the synthesized data. If the data
contains numerical attributes, the STEPS first discretizes the attributes before sanitization.
The STEPS procedure outperformed the one-step Laplace sanitizer in the application of the
youth voter data with a smaller SPECKS value across the examined range  values as well
as in some of the feasibility analyses at two practically small  values. Additionally, we
devise a new diagnostic tool, SPECKS, for comparing DIPS data to the original data. The
SPECKS application on the voter data demonstrates its straightforward implementation and
effectiveness as a metric to measure the similarity between data sets.
The STEPS method is based on the universal histogram approach, but improves it by
leveraging the inherent information in the data to determine the partitioning order. The
histogram tree in STEPS will stop growing once the hierarchical histogram reaches a pre-
specified height or according to a stopping rule. If there are remaining attributes, then the
STEPS applies a full cross-tabulation over those attributes and uses it as the lowest level of
the tree. Additionally, since the STEPS utilizes the general universal histogram idea, such as
that the released counts are weighted averages of multiple nodes in the tree given the inher-
ent consistency constraint, we expect that the STEPS procedure shares some of the general
properties of the universal histogram procedure. For example, the universal histogram pro-
cedure optimizes the accuracy of the sanitized nodes closer to the root (low-order marginals)
with the smallest MSE (relative to the original results) among the approaches that yield
unbiased sanitized estimators for the original results. universal histogram also satisfies the
consistency constraint at the sacrifice of a loss of accuracy in the sanitized high-order nodes
and the leaf nodes.
For future work, we will investigate the theoretical properties of the STEPS procedure
by examining the mean squared error of linear queries based on the sanitized counts from
the STEP procedure, in a similar manner as in Hay et al. (2010) and Qardaji et al. (2013c).
We expect the theoretical investigation will shed light on and help to choose an allocation
schedule for the overall privacy budget and a tree height. In addition, we will look into
developing a stopping rule to choose the tree height adaptively instead of setting it a prior,
such as by defining a threshold on MVA. If the MVA at a parent node at layer l is smaller
than the threshold, then the partitioning stops. The tree generated this way might have
branches of different length, so Eqns (2) and (3) might no longer apply. We plan to perform
theoretical and empirical researches along these lines and examine whether STEPS can be
further improved with the stopping rule incorporated into its procedure. Finally, we will
evaluate and compare SPECKS with other propensity-score based general utility measures
in an in-depth and comprehensive manner with empirical studies in the future.
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